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I. Introduction
Bilateral commercial contracts restricting domestic trade have assumed
an important role in advanced economies during this century. The prolifer-
ation of exclusive franchise agreements has led to an increased examination
of the impact of bilateral trade restrictions on market prices and delivery of
goods to the consumer. Such agreements may be advantageous to distribu-
tors as well as manufacturers. The efficient allocation of risk and profit
may require restrictions on the economic freedom normally enjoyed by
both parties. For example, an "exclusive" agent or distributor may contract
to merchandise a manufacturer's product in a defined territory and simulta-
neously promise not to carry competitive product lines. In a reciprocal
fashion, the manufacturer may undertake not to sell the products to any of
the distributor's competitors within the exclusive territory. The manufac-
turer's guarantee provides the distributor with an important incentive to
devote valuable resources to the promotion and sale of the manufacturer's
product. Similarly, the manufacturer retains the ability to control closely
the marketing and distribution of its product line.
In theory, exclusivity clauses are added to bilateral contracts where both
parties achieve some tangible benefit. However, such provisions may be
employed by the manufacturer in a series of bilateral contracts to achieve
distribution structures universally considered anathema to the notion of a
competitive free economy. For example, an extensive network of "exclu-
sive" distributorships may permit a manufacturer to circumvent domestic
resale price maintenance legislation. Thus, vertical trade restrictions
imposed on a number of retail agents may approximate the undesirable
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effects of horizontal cartellization between major producers of a particular
item. Additionally, a purportedly "exclusive" distribution scheme may be
employed by the manufacturer as a socially unacceptable justification for a
refusal to deal with third parties.
In recognition of both the economic advantages and the anti-competitive
effects of exclusive distribution agreements, the French legal system has
developed a framework for the analysis of these domestic trade restrictions.
French legislative, judicial and administrative institutions have responded
to the problems engendered by vertical non-price trade restrictions in ways
which may appear divergent from American antitrust doctrines. However,
the results produced by the French system often coincide with approaches
adopted by American courts.
In this article the author will present an analysis of certain legislative and
judicial restrictions upon exclusive economic agreements in France., In
particular, the article will examine French treatment of vertical restraints in
the form of exclusive dealing agreements and distribution networks in
domestic trade. A brief summary of the evolution of French antitrust law
will facilitate a better understanding of the various criteria currently
employed to determine the validity of exclusive distribution arrangements.
II. A Brief History of French Attempts to Regulate
Restrictive Trade Practices
a. Pre-Revolutionary Regulation
In the years preceding the French Revolution, business was strictly regu-
lated by non-legislative mechanisms.2 Compagnonnages 3 determined the
standards for the entry into and conduct of various commercial endeavors.
However, the physiocrats attacked the compagnonnage system as an unrea-
'This analysis is limited to an examination of French domestic legislative and judicial regu-
lation of exclusive distribution arrangements. French domestic commercial law is currently
undergoing a comprehensive harmonization with the law of the European Economic Commu-
nity. See generally Pepy, L'article 177 du Traite de Rome et lesjurisdictionsfranqaises, 52 REv.
CR. DR. INT. PR. 475 (1979). Soc. Photo Radio Club c. Nicolas et Soc. Brandt Frtres, discussed
infra at § IV(b)(i), explicated the relationship between French restrictive trade law and the
EEC competition law embodied in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. On May 9, 1963
the Cour d'appel d'Amiens held that exclusivity networks with purely internal (domestic)
effects are not likely to affect substantially trade between EEC members. Additionally, the
court stated that qualification of the exclusive dealing contracts under the exemptions of Arti-
cle 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome did not exempt the arrangements from the strictures of Article
37 of Ordonnance 45-1483 of June 30, 1945 (see § III(a)(i) infra). An appeal of the Amiens
decision was denied by the Cour de Cassation on October 22, 1964. For a summary of the
Brandt decision, see 2 Organization for Economic Development, Guide to Legislation on
Restrictive Trade Practices § F, 3.2 at 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as OECD].
'See generally LANDES, BUSINESS AND THE BUSINESSMAN IN MODERN FRANCE (Earle, ed.
1964).
3The campagnonnages were described as having filled the gap between the craftsman's
guilds and the labor unions. FRIEDLANDER & OSER, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN
EUROPE 175 (1953).
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sonable impediment to free competition. 4 One of the most notable victories
in this ideological struggle was the appointment of the prominent physio-
crat Anne Robert Jacques Turgot to the office of Controller General of
Finance during the reign of Louis XVI. 5 Although Turgot issued an
Ordonnance 6 in 1776 which effectively eviscerated the power of the com-
pagnonnages, the staunch resistance of the merchant class led to its demise
only half a year later.7
b. The Revolution of 1789 and the
Decrees of 1791
While the principles of individualism and equality espoused by the
French Revolution were antithetical to the compagnonnage system, these
ideals were not reflected in the sphere of restrictive trade practice legislation
until 1791. The Decree of March 2-17, 17918 may be properly character-
ized as the cornerstone of French antitrust legislation. 9 This provision
broadly affirmed the right of the individual to engage in the occupation of
his choice.' 0 However, it should be noted that the March 2-17, 1791 Decree
was enacted primarily for pragmatic reasons. The legislation made the
exercise of the established "right" contingent upon the payment of a new
business tax. I I
The French Parliament enacted the Decree of June 14-17, 179112 (Le
Chapelier's Act) under comparable circumstances. Although Parliament
had enunciated liberal ideas in the March Decree, the measure also fulfilled
a revenue-producing function. Similarly, Le Chapelier's Act was prompted
by a more immediate and conservative goal. This Act barred individuals in
the same occupation from consultation or coalition over matters of common
concern 13 and applied to all levels of commerce. The Decrees of 1791 con-
stituted a major divergence from pre-Revolutionary French attitudes
toward legislative regulation of trade.
4THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 87 (Blake ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Blake].
'VENTURINI, MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES IN FRANCE 20 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FRENCH RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES].
'See Edict No. 391 of February 7, 1776, 23 Louis XVI Recueil des Anciennes Lois Franqais
370 (1826).
7See generally FAURE, LA DISGRACE DE TURGOT (1961), cited in Blake, supra note 4, at 129,
n. 53.
'Decree of March 2-17, 1791, [1855] 35 Dalloz LUgis. 664 [hereinafter cited as D.L.].
'See Bergsten, Refusal to Sell as a Violation of Anti-Price Maintenance Legislation-The
French Experience, 49 IOWA L. REV. 43 (1963).
-[18551 35 D.L. 664.
"Id. Commentators have suggested that the inspirational tenor of the March 2-17, 1791
Decree was merely ancillary to the revenue-producing capacity of the legislation.
'"Decree of June 14-17, 1791 (Le Chapelier's Act), [1855] 27 D.L. 664.
"Id., Art. 2.
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c. The Economic Pro visions of the
French Penal Code
i) THE ANTI-ASSOCIATION PROVISIONS
The demands of war during the two decades following the 1791 Decrees
created the need to control rampant speculation. Articles 41514 and 41615
of the Penal Code extended the earlier ban on worker organization and
concerted activity to increase wages. Article 41416 imposed a complemen-
tary requirement upon employers to refrain from combinations to decrease
salary levels.
ii) ARTICLE 419
For the purposes of this analysis, Article 419 was the most significant
economic provision of the Penal Code.17 It is clear that the original formu-
lation' 8 of this article was not directed at combinations in restraint of trade.
The corporations no longer dominated commerce, and no monopolies (in
the present sense) controlled any important segment of the economy.
Rather, Article 419 was intended to address the problem of speculation in
an economy with limited means of distribution.
The language of Article 419 limited its effectiveness. However, French
courts interpreted the final paragraph of the provision as an invitation to
creative application. 19
d. The Law of 1864
The physiocratic model, which emphasized unrestrained competition
between the smallest economic entities, was modified significantly with the
passage of the Law of May 25-7, 1864.20 This law amended the Penal Code
'4Art. 415, C. PEN.
"Art. 416, C. PEN.
"CArt. 414, C. PEN.
"Art. 419 of the Penal Code was originally enacted to prevent monopolization and illicit
speculation in food commodities. Despite the strong commitment to the maintenance of a free
market economy prevalent in contemporaneous French legislation, there have been few
reported cases fully prosecuted under Article 419. See Riesenfield, The Legal Protection of
Competition in France, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 574, 578 (1960). Similarly, Articles 1382 and 1383 of
the Civil Code have not played any significant role in the regulation of exclusive distribution
agreements. This is because nearly all agreements found to be violative of the Civil Code
sections are also held to violate the criminal provisions of Article 419 of the Penal Code or
Ordonnance 45-1483 of June 30, 1945. For a rare example of a case brought exclusively under
the Civil Code, see Le Brie c. Laurent et autres, (Cour de Cassation, March 13, 1963), [1964]
Dalloz, Juris. 97 [hereinafter cited as D.J.].
"SThe text of Article 419 remained unchanged until 1926.
'"French judges were permitted to interpret Article 419 according to the peculiar economic
facts of each case. Pursuant to this provision, the courts determined whether an increase or
decrease in price resulted from illicit economic mechanisms. It is obvious that the concept of
"normal". or "natural" market operation is highly subjective. Tchernoff, Ententes Economiques
et Financi#res 235 (1933), translated in Blake, supra note 4, at 91.
'°Law of May 25-7, 1864, [1864] Recueil p6riodique et critique [hereinafter cited as D.P.] 4,
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to permit workers' and employers' coalitions. 21 Organization within these
groups for the purpose of affecting wage levels no longer carried criminal
penalties. 22 Nevertheless, certain commentators criticized the inherent dis-
parity of the 1864 amendments, noting that only merchants remained sub-
ject to the anti-coalition strictures of Penal Code Article 419.23
e. The Law of 1884: The Syndicat Professionel and the
Rise of the Defensive Entente
The Law of March 21, 188424 repealed Le Chapelier's Act 25 and estab-
lished the syndicat professionel. 26 The syndicats specifically were granted
the right to organize and collaborate for their collective economic interest.
The Law of 1884 removed the syndicat professionel from the scope of
Articles 291-294 and 416 of the Penal Code.
27
Inevitably, the courts were required to reconcile the Law of 1884 with
Penal Code Article 419. The assertion that the 1884 Law permitted the
collusive establishment of quotas in the absence of fraud was adjudicated
only four years after its enactment. In Grandean c. Heurteaux,28 a mineral
water producer excluded from an industry association commenced an
action under Article 419.29 The association executed contracts with Pari-
sian suppliers which prevented the suppliers from selling to non-association
members, except at a higher price. 30 The defendant members of the associ-
ation argued that the 1884 Law nullified Penal Code Article 419. Holding
for the plaintiff, the court concluded that Article 419 was not supplanted by
the Law of 1884. 3 1
Despite consistent judicial affirmance of the primacy of Article 419,32 the
Law of 1884 did signal a vital change in attitude toward the legality of
exclusivity agreements and similar restrictive combinations. The notion of
the 'defensive entente" 3 3 permitted the courts to circumvent the strict appli-
cation of Article 419. The refusal by the courts to invalidate combinations
other than those which were patently abusive engendered a greater variety
of restrictive agreements under the auspices of the defensive entente.
21Id.
22Id.
1See, e.g., Batbie, La loi sur les Coalitions, 24 REv. CRITIQUE DE LUGIS. 399 (1964).24Law of March 21, 1884, [1884] 4 D.P. 129.
2See note 12, supra.
'"Art. 31, Law of March 21, 1884, [1884] 4 D.P. 129.
27d.
2





3'See note 28, supra.
3 EDWARDS, TRADE REGULATION OVERSEAS 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS]. See
FRENCH RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 41.
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f. World War I and the Law of
April 20, 1916
By 1916, the war-ravaged French economy was experiencing the same
problems of speculation that had prompted legislative action a century ear-
lier. Price control legislation and a provision temporarily supplanting Arti-
cle 419 was adopted 34 and later extended.
35
Article 10 of the Law of April 20, 191636 eliminated several essential ele-
ments from the traditional Article 419 offense. Article 10 did not require
collective or even fraudulent action.37 Moreover, individuals could not be
prosecuted under the Law of 1916 for mere attempted speculation.
g. The 1926 Amendment of
Penal Code Article 419
Six years after the lapse of Article 10 of the Law of April 20, 1916, the
concern over trade restriction and the ententes prompted a study of legisla-
tive alternatives. The sole amendment to Article 419 was enacted after pro-
tracted debate by the Chamber of Deputies.38
Although the revised text of Article 419 did not incorporate expressly the
case law which had developed since the first enactment of the Penal Code,
the 1926 revision was interpreted as a ratification of the defensive entente.
This view is substantially corroborated by the fact that very few violations
of Article 419 were prosecuted through the Second World War. 39 Nonethe-
less, the revised version of Article 419 served as the predominant source of
French monopoly law until the promulgation of Decree 53-704 in 1953.
h. The Depression and Post-Depression
Era Legislation
i) THE RAYNAUD-ROLLIN BILL
Ententes enjoyed continued freedom from prosecution in France during
the 1930s. However, industry representatives remained concerned about
the potential for future prosecution under Article 419. In response, the gov-
ernment introduced the Raynaud-Rollin Bill 40 in 1932, which provided for
the official registration of certain ententes. The most significant portion of
14Art. 10, Law of April 20, 1916, [1916] J.0. 3375. This legislation was only in force during
the war years.
"Law of October 23, 1919, [1919] J.O. 11790.
"Law of April 20, 1916, (1916] J.O. 3375.
"Prosecutions of coalitions under Article 419 generally required proof of a fraudulent act.
See Le Goaziou c. Plihou, (Trib. correct. de la Seine, May 3, 1901), aI'd (Cour d'appel de Paris
January 17, 1902), [1903] 2 D.P. 297.
"Law of December 3, 1926, [1926] J.0. 12722. The bill was introduced in 1923. See [19231
J.0. docs. parl., ch. d6p., Annexe No. 6267 at 1501.
"It is interesting to note that no large industrial ententes were challenged under Article 419
during this period. Blake, supra note 4, at 98.
'11932] J.O. docs. parl., S6nat., Annexe No. 182, at 181.
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the Bill granted immunity from private prosecution 4 1 to registered
ententes. 42 Further, a consultative committee for industrial and commer-
cial ententes was to be established 43 to advise the government on policy
matters. The Raynaud-Rollin Bill eventually died in committee, thus dash-
ing hopes for legislative reform.
ii) THE FLANDIN-MARCHANDEAU BILL
The further atrophy of the French economy in subsequent years 4 raised
serious questions concerning the continued efficacy of the voluntary
entente, As economic and political pressures grew, the Flandin-Mar-
chandeau Bill was introduced in 1935.45 This proposed legislation would
have empowered the government to declare ententes to be compulsory
under specific circumstances for a limited period of time.46 Similar to the
Raynaud-Rollin Bill in certain respects, the Flandin-Marchandeau legisla-
tion provided for the creation of an industry advisory committee. 47
The Flandin-Marchandeau Bill prompted vigorous debate in the Cham-
ber of Deputies between rightist and leftist economists. A most significant
provision of this legislation was the new power granted to the compulsory
entente. These coalitions could restrict production and limit the entry of
potential competitors into the market.48 Moreover, taxes could be imposed
and loans advanced by compulsory ententes to promote the modification of
undesirable features of the current economy.49 Although the Flandin-Mar-
chandeau Bill was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies in 1935, the meas-
ure died before reaching the Senate floor. 50
Despite the failure of the legislature to adopt the Flandin-Marchandeau
Bill, subsequent decrees permitted substantially the same results in certain
sectors of the economy.51 The relaxed official attitude toward restrictive
combinations engendered the further development of private cartels. While
many industry associations probably violated the strictures of Penal Code
Article 419, it was clear that the French government did not intend to dis-
courage these combinations in the face of economic necessity.
"In many instances, French law permits individuals to initiate criminal prosecutions.
Under the Raynaud-Rollin Bill, only the government would have retained the power to prose-
cute properly registered ententes.
42[19321 J.O. does. parl., S6nat., Annexe No. 182.
43Id
"See generally FRENCH RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 41-46.
4'[1935] J.O. does. parl., ch. d6p., Annexe No. 4440, at 24.
"Id.47The consultative group was referred to as the Comit6 d'Arbitrage.
4[1935] J.0. does. parl., ch. d6p., Annexe No. 4440, at 24.
4 Id., Art. 3.
" [1935] J.0. does. parl., Sfnat., Annexe No. 554 at 431.
"See e.g. Art. 49, Law of July 11, 1938, [1939] J.0. 8330.
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iii) THE COMITIES D'ORGANISATION
The Decree-law of August 16, 194052 authorized the formation of
Comitts d'Organisation as part of an attempt to bolster industrial and gov-
ernmental control over the economy. As a creation of the Vichy govern-
ment, the Comit~s soon lost favor even within the business community.
Although the Comit~s were formally dissolved in 1946, 53 their influence
continued in the form of loosely-controlled trade ententes. Further, Ordon-
nance 45-1483 of June 30, 194554 prevented the removal of war-induced
price control measures.
i. Post- World War II Legislation
i) THE PROPOSAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
In 1950, the French government proposed the centralization of economic
power in a governmental administrative agency.55 This proposal was
prompted by a growing dissatisfaction with the reliance upon Penal Code
Article 419 as a means for controlling restrictive trade practices. The pro-
posed legislation signalled a major departure from the punitive limitations
imposed pursuant to the historic French treatment of restrictive coalitions.
The government sought to prevent undesirable market effects through the
development of a specialized agency. Such an organization could articulate
specific standards of conduct and develop enforcement techniques through
the power to institute criminal proceedings.
ii) THE LAW OF JULY 18, 1952
The Law of July 18, 1952 caused another clash of economic interests, and
two years after its introduction amendments by the Council of the Republic
threatened to destroy any chance of reconciliation with the original version
enacted by the National Assembly.5 6 Passage of the bill was intended to
provide the government with a weapon against horizontal price fixing until
the legislature could enact a permanent antitrust regime. 57
The drafters of the Law of July 18, 1952 creatively grafted anti-horizontal
price fixing provisions onto Article 37 of the 1945 Ordonnance. The 1945
Ordonnance already provided an established enforcement procedure
through the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance. The 1952 Law
effectively instituted legislative prohibitions against horizontal restraints
and a mechanism for their enforcement.
"Decree of August 16, 1940, [1945] J.O. 4150.




51[1950] J.0. docs. part. Ass. Nat. 9951.
5 See [1952] J.0. dab. part. Ass. Nat. 3799; [1953] J.O. dab. part. Con. Rep. 804.
"Law 52-835 of July 18, 1952, [1952] J.O. 7227.
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j. The Legislative Decrees of the 1950s
With little prospect for legislative consensus on a comprehensive law reg-
ulating trade restrictions, the Government obtained the authority to legis-
late through decrees on July 11, 1953.58 Meanwhile, a severe economic
crisis intensified as workers went on strike throughout France.59 Consumer
pressure for legislative control of prices prompted a flurry of government
initiatives. The Law of July 18, 1952 was replaced by Decree 53-704 a year
later.60 The 1953 Decree specifically proscribed a number of restrictive
trade practices, including resale price maintenance.
III. Application of French Legislative Doctrines to
Exclusive Distribution Arrangements
a. Decree 53-704 of A ugust 9, 1953
Decree 53-704 of August 9, 1953 was enacted primarily to curtail wide-
spread labor unrest. Consequently, much of the Decree's impact was
directed toward restrictive trade practices relating to consumer pricing.
6
'
i) THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 37 OF
ORDONNANCE 45-1483 OF JUNE 30, 1945
While nullifying the amendments to Article 3762 enacted in the Law of
July 18, 1952, Decree 53-704 added the offense of vertical price fixing to the
extant horizontal price fixing prohibition and proscribed refusals to sell and
pricing discrimination. 63 The revised Article 37 also retained the wartime
ban on the use of tying clauses.64
Article 37 permits refusals to sell in four instances. Unavailability of sup-
plies, lack of good faith on behalf of the purchaser, illegality, and non-
conformity of purchase requests all constitute valid bases for a refusal to
deal with prospective purchasers. 65 However, the most significant excep-
tion for purposes of this analysis has been developed through government
ministerial circulars and by French courts under the general category of
"unavailability." Properly structured exclusive dealing agreements
between a manufacturer and distributors may be sufficient to establish legal
unavailability of goods.6 6
'"Law 53-611 of July 11, 1953, [1953] J.O. 6143.
"Blake, supra note 4, at 107.
'Decree 53-704 of August 9, 1953, [1953] J.O. 7045.
"'Id.
"1945 Ordonnance, Art. 37(3).
"'Note that Article 37 has only been applied to the regulation of resale price maintenance.
Blake, supra note 4, at 112.
"Compare section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2.
6 1945 Ordonnance, Art. 37.
"See Fontanet Circular, § I1(b)(iii) infra.
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ii) THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 59 OF
ORDONNANCE 45-1483 OF JUNE 30, 1945
Decree 53-704 also modified Article 59 of the 1945 Ordonnance by
adding three supplementary paragraphs. The first paragraph broadly pro-
hibits acts which combine to increase (or prevent the reduction of) prices.6 7
Additionally, Decree 53-704 provided for the establishment of a Technical
Commission on Combines.68 The Commission, which included representa-
tives of labor, industry, and the judiciary, was intended to guide the Minis-
try for Economic Affairs and Finance in its enforcement of the prohibitions.
Unless the Commission failed to act within six months, the government was
required to obtain the opinion of the Commission before instituting crimi-
nal proceedings under Article 59.69 Article 59 was further amended on July
2, 1963 by Law 63-628,70 which prohibits entities occupying a dominant
market position from acting singly or in combination to impede natural
market operation.
Article 59 bis proscribes combinations and actions which effectively dis-
tort or restrain competition. 7' Although the original draft of Article 59 bis
limited the scope of the provision to acts promoting an artificial increase in
prices or artificially preventing a natural price decrease, 72 a 1967 revision
added the limitation of competition and the restriction of technological pro-
gress to the list of Article 59 offenses. 73 Despite these extensions of the
coverage of Article 59 bis, most applications to the Commission alleged
price-related violations. Article 59 has played a role subsidiary to that of
Article 37 in the regulation of exclusive distribution contracts and territorial
allocations.
Article 59 ter creates exceptions to Article 59 bis violations where the
activities in question are determined to be beneficial to the economy.74 If
the adverse market effects were created pursuant to a statutorily authorized
combination or activity, the Technical Commission on Combines and
Dominant Positions75 could dismiss a claim of illegality under Article 59
bis. The more important exception to Article 59 bis is based upon proof by
the accused parties that their actions tended to promote economic progress
or increase productivity.76 As in earlier French laws, the legislature was
careful to permit the continued operation of certain currently existing
restrictive ententes.




0 Law 63-628 of July 2, 1963, Art. 3 11963] J.O. 5915.
71945 Ordonnance, Art. 59 bis.
72See [1958] J.O. 5877.
"Ordonnance 67-835 of September 28, 1967 [1967] J.O. 1952.
'41945 Ordonnance, Art. 59 ter.
7"Law 63-628 of July 2, 1963, Art. 3. [1963] J.O. 5915 substituted this title for the former
Technical Commission on Combines.
"1945 Ordonnance, Art. 59 ter.
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The Technical Commission on Combines and Dominant Positions was
not a judicial or quasi-judicial entity. The Commission's decisions were not
limited to formal applications of Article 59 of Decree 53-704 of August 9,
1953. Rather, the Commission appeared to consider factors beyond the
confines of the legislation.77 Thus, important French enterprises were able
to avoid the strict application of Article 59 bis even where non-exempt
(under Article 59 ter) transactions had occurred.
b. Act 77-806, Decree 77-1189 and the Ministerial
Circular of February 14, 1978
Act 77-80678 of October 25, 1977 further amended the provisions of the
1945 Ordonnance. Decree 77-118979 and the Ministerial Circular of Febru-
ary 14, 197880 set forth a modified series of administrative guidelines and
replaced the Technical Commission on Combines and Dominant Positions
with the Competition Commission.
Section 4 of Act 77-806 encompasses a broad range of economic activity,
including all legal acts or transactions which permit an entity or group of
entities to exercise influence over other economic enterprises. 8' However,
the 1977 Act only applies to entities or combinations which create effects
exceeding certain threshold limits.
82
Under the provisions of the 1977 Act, enterprises conducting activities
which may fall within the Act may voluntarily notify the Director-General
for Competition and Prices of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Finance. Upon receiving notification, the Minister may endorse the propo-
sal or refer it to the Competition Commission within three months. 83 If the
Minister takes no action within three months, he has tacitly approved the
proposal and cannot thereafter refer the proposal to the Competition
Commission.84
c. The Law of October 14, 1943
The Law of October 14, 1943,85 relating to commercial exclusivity
clauses, limits the duration of most contracts with exclusivity provisions.
The duration of an entire exclusive dealing contract may not exceed ten
"Although the decisions of the Commission were not published subsequent to 1962, earlier
published opinions weighed the potential benefit of the acts against alleged technical
violations.
"Act No. 77-806, October 25, 1977 [1977] J.O. 3833.
"Decree 77-1189, October 25, 1977 [1977] J.O. 5223.
'Circular of February 14, 1978, iranslated in OECD, supra note 1, at 1.10.
"Section 4, Act No. 77-806, see Circular of February 14, 1978 at 1.12.
"
2A vertical concentration is not subject to regulation under the 1977 Act and amendments
to the 1945 Ordonnanc, unless the activities of one entity in question affect 25% of the domes-
tic market and the activities of the related or affiliated entity affect 25% of the domestic market
of different goods. Id. See Circular of February 14, 1978.
"Circular of February 14, 1978, at 1.2.
'Id.
"Law No. 556 of October 14, 1943 [1943] 2 Gaz. Pal. Ldg. 368 [hereinafter cited as G.P.L.].
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years under this law. 86 However, commercial custom in France usually
limits the agreements to a range of one to three years. 87 Although the Law
of October 14, 1943 does impose a durational constraint on the continuation
of exclusive dealing contracts, it plays no significant role in the regulation
of the substantive terms of these agreements.
d. The 1953 and 1958 Decrees and
Ministerial Interpretation
i) THE 1954 CIRCULAR
Although a cursory examination of Article 37 of Ordonnance 45-1483 of
June 30, 1945 might suggest the inclusion of exclusive dealing agreements
under the antidiscrimination provisions, the Decree of August 9, 1953 and a
subsequent ministerial circular8 8 (the 1954 Circular) further modified the
legislative restrictions upon exclusive distribution arrangements.
The 1954 Circular explicitly exempted exclusive distribution agreements
from the refusal to sell strictures of Article 37 of the 1945 Ordonnance.8 9
However, the exception only applied to bilateral and reciprocal contracts.
Specifically, the legislation required that the distributor or exclusive dealer
be formally bound to provisions consistent with its grant of exclusivity. 90
ii) THE SYNDICA r DEs GRossisTEs EN M4T'RIEL
ELECTRIQUE DE PROVENCE CASE
Several years after the government's official pronouncement sanctioning
exclusive dealing agreements, the Conseil d'dtat 9 1 struck down Articles 2
and 3 of the 1953 Decree as unconstitutional. In Syndicat des grossistes en
matwriel electrique de Provence,92 the Conseil d'6tat nullified the 1953 legis-
lation as an unlawful extension of executive power. The opinion did not
address specifically the status of exclusivity agreements.
iii) DECREE 58-545 OF JUNE 24, 1958 AND THE
FONTANET CIRCULAR
Following the decision of the Conseil d'6tat, the government published
Decree 58-545 on June 24, 195893 (the 1958 Decree). This enactment sub-
stantially duplicated the 1953 Decree provisions regarding the validity of
exclusive distribution contracts. As in the 1953 Decree, the new legislation
provided exceptions for abnormal demands, illegality and bad faith. Simi-
1'Id., Art. I.
"'See generally Champaud, La concession commerciale, 16 REV. TRIM. D. COMMER. 451, 475
(1963).
""[19541 1 G.P.L. 597.
-1Id.




"'[1958] 2 G.P.L. 9.
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larly, the 1958 Decree also failed to provide explicitly for an exclusive dis-
tribution exemption. However, the 1958 insertion of the words "upon the
customary trade terms" was interpreted as a partial attempt to lend legiti-
macy to certain exclusive dealing contracts. 94
On March 31, 1960 the French government published the most compre-
hensive statement to date concerning the governmental regulation of exclu-
sive commercial relationships. The Fontanet Circular" resulted in part
from a concern that the mere designation of existing contracts as "exclu-
sive" by a manufacturer would circumvent the intent of the 1958 Decree.
The Circular thus proceeded to make the validity of an exclusivity provi-
sion in a French commercial contract contingent on the satisfaction of cer-
tain criteria.
Under the Fontanet Circular, a valid exclusive distribution arrangement
must contain the following elements:
1) Manufacturer's Obligations.96 The manufacturer must be bound by
some restriction, such as a covenant not to establish competing opera-
tions within the exclusive distributor's territory.
2) Exclusive Dealer or Distributor's Obligations.97 The distributor ben-
eficiary of the exclusive contractual relationship must assume reciprocal
duties. Typically, these consist of promises not to distribute products or
services which compete directly with the manufacturer's product or
service.
3) Limitations on the Exclusivity Provision.98 The agreement must pro-
vide specific limitations on the zone of exclusivity granted by the contract
(i.e., a purportedly exclusive territorial franchise must truly be exclusive).
4) Improvement in Service or Efficiency.99 The entire arrangement
must be (at least partially) intended to improve the quantitative or quali-
tative delivery of goods or services to the consumer.
Although the fourth element has been considered to be the most signifi-
cant, it is easily satisfied. For example, an increase in the exclusive dealer's
knowledge of the product or his ability to serve customers has been inter-
preted as fulfilling this requirement. The 1958 Decree does not establish
fixed minimum standards. However, an exclusive dealing agreement with
no purpose other than the maintenance of a minimum pricing schedule
would fail under this test. 100
It is also important to note that the Fontanet Circular does not prevent
the insertion of non-reciprocal provisions which are necessary for ordinary
"See, e.g., Plaisant & Lassier, Die Neue Kartell Rechiliche Entwicklung in Frankreich, Win-
schafi und Wetbewerb 427, 429 (1960), cited in EDWARDS, supra note 33, at 69. See also the
discussion of the Brandt case, infra at IV(b)(i).







business operations.' 0' Provisions of this nature must conform to the limi-
tations expressed in the fourth element enumerated above.
IV. Examples of French Judicial Interpretation of
Exclusive Distribution Provisions
a. Introduction.: Prior Case Law
Historically, the French legislature has recognized that exclusive dealing
provisions may serve a useful economic function, and this tradition has
been'reflected in French judicial treatment of such agreements.' 0 2 Several
early cases provide a general illustration of the extent to which economic
expediency engendered judicial tolerance of a variety of restrictive trade
practices.
i) THE HoUBIG.ANT CASE
In Houbigant et Groupement des parfumeurs de marques reglemenhees c.
Chenivesse, alle Soulage et Chunn, 10 3 a manufacturer of perfume sued retail
distributors for breach of a minimum price covenant. The retailers sold the
goods to a third merchant, who marketed the products at less than the stip-
ulated price. The Cour d'appel de Paris established that manufacturers
could fix minimum price levels as a matter of law. 104 This holding was
premised upon the perceived right of the manufacturer of luxury products
to prevent derogation of an established brand name through underpric-
ing. 105 However, this line of reasoning was held applicable only in the case
of non-essential products of limited distribution. 0 6 The Houbigant case
was upheld on appeal by the Cour de Cassation. 1
07
ii) THE SAVOIE CASE
In Soc tP /'Oreal c. Savoie, plaintiff cosmetic manufacturer sued a
retailer for a similar minimum price clause breach. The defendant retailer
argued that he had no contractual relationship with the manufacturer and
therefore was not bound by the minimum price schedule. However, the
"Compare this concept with the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 364 U.S. 320 (1961).
"
2See, e.g., Barolle et Soc. Biscuits Olibert (Cour d'appel de Bordeaux, July 11, 1960),
[1960] 2 G.P.L. 148 rev'don other grounds (Cour de Cassation, July 13, 1961), [1961] 2 Gaz.
Pal. Juris. 84; and Soc. Anon. Librarie Aristide Quillet et al. (Conseil d'dtat, May 5, 1961),
[1961] 1 G.P.J. 411, affirming the validity of certain exclusive dealing agreements which satis-
fied the criteria set forth in the Fontanet Circular of March 31, 1960.
""(Cour d'appel de Paris, Dec. 17, 1932), 11963] G.P.J. 290 [hereinafter cited as Houbigant).
"4Id.
""Under U.S. law, a manufacturer can control distribution practices to the extent necessary
to preserve the integrity of a product. See Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589
F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
"'Houbigant, supra note 103.
",,7Chunn c. Parfumeries Houbigant et al., (Cour de Cassation August 3, 1934), [1932] G.P.J.
640.
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Tribunal de Commerce adopted the same theory raised by the plaintiff in
Houbigant, supra. The Tribunal de Commerce extended the right of the
manufacturer to protect his luxury trademarks by disregarding the lack of
privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. 0 8
iii) THE REvIROT CASE
Socitib Guerlain c. Revirot involved plaintiff cosmetic manufacturer's suit
against a retailer for unauthorized distribution of plaintiffs products. '0 9 In
France, plaintiff Guerlain Company had developed an exclusive distribu-
tion network which adhered to the Guerlain display and pricing guidelines.
The defendant counterclaimed that Guerlain had established the exclusive
distribution system as an anti-competitive vertical restrictive mechanism in
violation of the 1958 Decree. 110 After a review of the exclusive contract
provisions employed by Guerlain, the Tribunal de Commerce de Nice
rejected the defense and held the defendant guilty of the illicit sale of plain-
tiffs cosmetic products. I I I
iv) SUMMARY OF EARLY CASE LAW
Although the preceding three cases do not provide a comprehensive
review of pre-Fontanet Circular case law regarding exclusive distribution
agreements and refusals to deal, they illustrate the reluctance of French
judges to transcend the precise language of restrictive trade legislation. In
the absence of any legislative authorization to examine the relative bargain-
ing strength of the parties or the potentially anti-competitive effects of verti-
cal restraints, the French judiciary cautiously affirmed the right of
manufacturers to maintain extensive control over the entire marketing pro-
cess.11 2 In future cases, modified legislation and the legally non-binding
administrative guidance of the Ministry for Economics and Finance would
provide the courts with the necessary analytical basis for the evaluation of
exclusive distribution arrangements.
b. Modern Case Law
i) THE BRANDT CASE
A leading contemporary case in the area of exclusive distribution is Soc.
Photo Radio Club c. Nicolas et Soc. Brandt Fr/res.113 Plaintiff, a discount
trader, charged that the Brandt Company had wrongfully refused to sell
him photographic items. Plaintiff further alleged that the request presented
"(Trib. de commerce de Versailles, June 14, 1939), [1939] 2 G.P.J. 360.
"'(Trib. de commerce de Nice, May 30, 1960), [19601 2 G.P.J. 27.
"'See the unsigned note, id. at 28.
1'd.
"
2Compare the distinction between ancillary and non-ancillary restraints developed in early
American cases, which later evolved into the "rule of reason." See U.S. v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"'(Trib. correct. de la Seine, July 18, 1960), [1960] 2 G.P.J. 102.
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to defendent Brandt was not illegal, abnormal or made in bad faith. The
Tribunal correctional de la Seine 114 found that the defendant had estab-
lished a network of exclusive distributors with the sole purpose of circum-
venting the resale price maintenance prohibitions.' 15 After finding that
Brandt had also failed to define specifically the territorial limitations 1 6 of
the exclusive franchises, the Tribunal fined the Brandt Company for an
unjustified refusal to sell.' 17
On appeal, the Cour d'appel de Paris 81 8 determined that the existence of
exclusive dealing arrangements with other retail outlets did not provide a
defense to the charge of an unjustified refusal to sell. The Paris court fur-
ther held that exclusive distribution systems were not included in the enu-
merated exceptions to the refusal to sell legislation.'19
The defendant subsequently appealed to the Cour de Cassation. In a
July 11, 1962 decision, the Cour de Cassation vacated the judgment below
and transferred the case to the Cour d'appel d'Amiens. Although minis-
terial circulars have no binding statutory or precedential effect,12 0 the Cour
de Cassation essentially adopted the rationale expressed in the Fontanet
Circular of March 31, 1960. The Cour de Cassation held that exclusive
distribution agreements cannot justify a refusal to sell where maintenance
of a minimum price is even an ancillary goal of the manufacturer. Hov-
ever, the court recognized that exclusive agency contracts may actually
serve the interest of the consumer where merchandising of the product in
question requires a degree of technical expertise.
The Cour de Cassation stated that marketing practices relating to high
quality or limited distribution items may constitute a valid custom of trade.
Thus, these customs may fall within the purview of Article 37(l)(a) of the
1945 Ordonnance.121 In each case, the lower court must determine whether
the exclusive distribution network serves a valid purpose or unjustifiably
restricts free competition.
The Cour d'appel d'Amiens subsequently examined the Brandt distribu-
tion system according to the Cour de Cassation's suggested analysis. On
May 9, 1963, the Amiens court held that defendant Brandt's exclusive deal-
ing arrangements did not suffice to justify a refusal to sell to the plaintiff. 122
The Cour de Cassation rejected an appeal of this decision in 1964.123
1141d.
.. 1945 Ordonnance, Art. 37.
'"The Brandt Company reserved the right to appoint several distributors within the same
purportedly "exclusive" territory.
"
7 (Trib. correct. de la Seine, July 13, 1960), [19601 2 G.P.J. 102.
" (Cour d'appel de Paris, February 7, 1961), [1961] 1 G.P.J. 170.
'1945 Ordonnance, Art. 37(l)(a).
'""See, e.g., [1961] 1 G.P.J. 411. A summary is translated in OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 2.
'2,1945 Ordonnance, Art. 37.
'
2 (Cour d'appel d'Amiens, May 9, 1963), [19631 D.J. 556. See translation in OECD, supra
note 1, 3.0 at 5, which includes discussion of the applicability of EEC law to the Brandt case.
"
2
'(Cour de Cassation, October 22, 1964), [1964] D.J. 753.
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ii) THE BRUNEL CASE
Following the Brandt decision, the Cour de Cassation clarified the degree
of exclusivity necessary to constitute a valid exception to the refusal to sell
prohibitions. Procureur Gen. c. Brune1 24 arose from a cleaning products
manufacturer's refusal to sell inventory to consumer retailers. When the
case came before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lille, 125 the court
accepted the defendant's contention that the requests had been abnormal in
character. Thus, an essential element of the Article 37 offense had not been
established and the case was dismissed. This acquittal was affirmed by the
Cour d'appel de Douai. 126
The Procureur General appealed to the Cour de Cassation, which
quashed the lower court judgments 127 and transferred the case to the Cour
d'appel de Dijon. In vacating the case, the Cour de Cassation held that the
size of the initial order, without more, did not justify the conclusion that it
was abnormal.
The Cour d'appel de Dijon determined that the defendant manufac-
turer's exclusive distribution agreements with hardware retailers constituted
legal "unavailability" of merchandise. Accordingly, the Dijon court termi-
nated proceedings against the manufacturer. 128
The Cour de Cassation heard an appeal from the Procureur General of
the Cour d'appel de Dijon and quashed the judgment of the Dijon court.
In remanding the case to the Cour d'appel d'Amiens, the Cour de Cassation
reaffirmed its adoption of the Government's administrative criteria for the
determination of the validity of exclusive dealing agreements. The Cour de
Cassation emphasized the requirement of true reciprocity of obligations,
recognizing that the exclusive distributors under contract with the defend-
ant manufacturer were permitted to sell various lines of merchandise in
direct competition with defendant's products.' 29 Thus, the failure to satisfy
the Fontanet Circular's requirement of mutual limitation of commercial
freedom precluded the interposition of defendant's exclusive distribution
network as a defense to a refusal to sell allegation.
On remand, the Cour d'appel d'Amiens 30 applied the Cour de Cassa-
tion's analysis and determined that the defendant manufacturer was guilty
of an illicit refusal to sell. The Cour de Cassation rejected the defendant's
'
2 (Cour de Cassation, January 9, 1963), [1963] 1 G.P.J. 275, summary translation in OECD,
supra note i, 3.0, at 6.
'
2 (Trib. de Grande Instance de Lille, October 19, 1961), OECD, supra note 1, 3,0 at 6.
"
2 (Cour d'appel de Douai, April 12, 1962), OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 6.
"
7(Cour de Cassation, January 9, 1963), OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 6.
'
28(Cour d'appel de Dijon, June 7, 1963), OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 6.
29Compare U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), where the defendant's refusal to
deal was held to be based upon an invalid resale price maintenance scheme. See also Eiberger
v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968).
"'(Cour d'appel d'Amiens, June 17, 1965), OECD, supra note i, 3.0 at 6.
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subsequent appeal of the final decision of the Amiens court. 13 1
iii) THE SENECLAUZE CASE
The role of judicial tests of validity in the regulation of French exclusive
dealing networks increased as the courts became more comfortable with the
application of quasi-administrative criteria. In Seneclauze et Thurin,' 32 a
wholesale wine merchant sought to obtain wine from Seneclauze.
Seneclauze requested that the merchant agree not to sell the wine within
territory previously allocated to an exclusive dealer under contract with
Seneclauze. The merchant did not assent to this condition of sale, and
Seneclauze refused to accept the order for the wine. When the merchant
sued claiming illicit restraint of competition, the Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-
Provence13 3 held that the exclusive dealing agreement established by
Seneclauze precluded application of the refusal to sell provisions of the
1945 Ordonnance. As the wines produced by the manufacturer were con-
sidered to be high quality items requiring particular expertise in distribu-
tion, the Cour d'appel concluded that the exclusive distribution network
actually may have improved service to the consumer.134 Moreover, it was
apparent in this case that the exclusive retailer was free to sell the wine at
any price he chose. 3"
On appeal, the Cour de Cassation reversed the decision of the Cour
d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence for its failure to analyze sufficiently the absolute
territorial exclusivity granted to the distributor. The Cour de Cassation
also found the lower court's examination of the plaintiffs technical qualifi-
cations to be deficient.136
The Cour de Cassation transferred the case to the Cour d'appel de
Nimes. The Nimes court found the defendant guilty of an illicit refusal to
deal in violation of the 1945 Ordonnance. This decision was premised upon
the absolute territorial prohibition created by the exclusive distribution
network. 137
V. Some Observations on the Development of the
French Law of Exclusive Distribution
The broad reach of the antitrust laws in France led many manufacturers
to develop more complex vertical structures to retain control over the distri-
bution of goods. The increasing use of vertical mechanisms by manufactur-
ers forced the government to fashion new antitrust policies. Theoretically,
3 (Cour de Cassation, December 22, 1965), OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 6.
13
2 (Cour de Cassation, March 21, 1972), [1972] 2 G.P.J. 855, OECD, supra note I, 3.0 at 7
[hereinafter cited as Seneclauzel.
"'(Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence, December 23, 1970), OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 7.
"'Compare, Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., supra note 105; see Mitchell v.
United States Surgical Corp., (CCH) 1976-1 TRADE CAS. 60,879 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
'




'17See OECD, supra note 1, 3.0 at 7.
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the vertical arrangements were easily distinguishable from classic antitrust
offenses, such as horizontal collusion. In many cases, vertical restraints
were imposed at the express request of the party with the weaker bargaining
position. The continued development of vertical distribution schemes also
played an important role in bringing a wider range of products to a larger
segment of the population.
However, the increasing complexity of distribution agreements, com-
bined with greater judicial restriction of horizontal arrangements, produced
vertical networks which engendered the same deleterious effects proscribed
by applications of antitrust law to horizontal structures. An example of this
is the tying agreement, which has been invalidated under both French' 38
and American 139 law. French law now recognizes the validity of arrange-
ments which preserve the integrity and uniformity of distribution of the
manufacturer's product.' 40 Conversely, it is equally clear that exclusivity
networks may not be employed merely to enforce prohibited resale price
maintenance schemes.
Initially, France did not have a sufficient legislative framework to regu-
late exclusive distribution agreements. As both France and the United
States did already possess a broad legislative mandate to regulate anti-com-
petitive arrangements, it is instructive to compare the manner in which
these two countries developed an analytical system to scrutinize vertical
trade restrictions. In the United States, the courts took the lead in formulat-
ing an approach to the problem. Through a series of often-contradictory
Supreme Court opinions, a loose doctrinal analysis has supplemented
existing legislation. However, the judicial development of the law of exclu-
sive distribution networks has exacted a significant cost in terms of
predictability. 141
The French legal system places much less emphasis on judicially created
doctrines. As a result, French courts have been reluctant to invalidate
" "See Soc. Anonyme Union Industrielle des petroles c. Juster el Sa.r.1. des Etablissments
Juster et Cie, (Cour de Cassation, October 18, 1966), [1967] Recuel Dalloz-Sirey Sommaire
53.
"3,See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
'°Fontanet Circular § III (March 31, 1960), reprinted in OECD, supra note I, 1.7 at 10;
compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
GTE Sylvanial.
"'Theper se rule is attractive to the courts both as a method of simplifying analysis and as a
way to foster predictability and uniformity in application. While there are strong arguments in
favor of the per se illegality of certain vertical restraints, such an approach does not permit a
comparison of the pro-competitive interbrand effect with the anti-competitive intrabrand
effects created by many exclusive distribution networks. Thus, the Court in GTE Sylvania,
supra note 140, overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and
reinstated the "rule of reason" elucidated in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963) [hereinafter cited as White Motor], to facilitate a more realistic evaluation of vertical
restraints of trade. The obvious disadvantage of the GTE Sylvania holding is that it fails to
provide lower courts with guidance as to the correct application of the new standards. See
generally United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-610 (1972).
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exclusive distribution arrangements in the absence of clear anti-competitive
effects. This should be contrasted with American legislation, which permits
the invalidation of potentially anti-competitive practices. 142 The gap in the
French antitrust regime has been filled by the administrative branch.
Through various ministerial pronouncements, culminating in the Fontanet
Circular, the limitations upon exclusive relationships have been delineated.
The French courts immediately adopted the reasoning of the ministerial
circulars despite the fact that these pronouncements are not considered to
be a binding source of law. 143 It appears that this approach lacks the
flexibility of the vertical restraint analysis adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 144 However, it does
enhance commercial predictability and prevents the courts from assuming
an analytical function for which they are not adequately informed. 145
In marked contrast to the American legal system, the French have. pro-
vided a relatively consistent analytical framework for the evaluation of
exclusive economic arrangements. The French courts have adopted a de
facto "rule of reason" through which the social benefits of restrictive agree-
ments may be weighed against their anti-competitive effects. 146 The advan-
tages of this approach in a developing economy are obvious. The major
difficulty inherent in the balancing approach, potential unpredictability, is
partially alleviated in France through such mechanisms as the Competition
Commission. Nevertheless, the French and American analyses of certain
trade restraints have often been consistent. 147
In a sense, restrictive arrangements in France have been analyzed histori-
cally in terms of their function in the world of commerce. The very exist-
ence of the tribunaux de commerce and the Competition Commission
"
2 Under section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, a plaintiff need only establish that a
practice is likely to produce anti-competitive effects.
41Soc Anon. Librairie Aristide Quillet et autres, (Con. d'6tat, May 5, 1961), [1961] D.J. 407.
'"GTE Sylvania, supra note 140.
"See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), citedin GTE Sylvania,
supra note 140, 433 U.S. at 50, n. 16.
'"See generally La documentation franqais, Ententes et monopoles dans le monde, France
(Note et etudes documentaires No. 1736) 40 (1953).
"7For example, in Soc. Photo Radio Club c. Nicolas et Soc. Brandt Frres, supra note 113,
and White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 141, the lower courts of France and the
United States invalidated vertical restrictions which prevented one party to an exclusive distri-
bution agreement from selling to willing purchasers of the product. On appeal, the higher
courts of both nations reversed and remanded the cases for further adjudication. While the
remand in White Motor specifically directed the lower court to conduct a detailed economic
examination of the relevant market factors, the French court did not find that such a study was
warranted. This may appear surprising in light of the exemption in Article 37(l)(a) of the 1945
Ordonnance for agreements which promote improvements in service to the consumer. None-
theless, this holding is consistent with French judicial precedents.
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indicates a frank recognition that specific regulation of complex commercial
arrangements requires specialized expertise. However, the determination of
important economic questions by tribunals dominated by members of the
business community may legitimate commercial practices without adequate
consideration of the ultimate effect of these arrangements upon the
consumer.

